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Introduction
This paper reviews social protection and agriculture poli-
cies in Malawi in order to explore the links, synergies and 
conflicts that lie between them. It begins with brief back-
ground information about Malawi, in terms of its 
economic and welfare indicators. Particular emphasis is 
placed on understanding agricultural and social protec-
tion policies within the context of (a) political issues and 
(b) market and livelihood development. This is followed 
with a review of agricultural and social protection poli-
cies, their interactions and their impacts on livelihoods 
and welfare. Specific attention is given to evolving input 
subsidy policies which are of particular relevance to this 
review. We conclude with a discussion of lessons that 
can be learned from Malawian experience with agricul-
ture and social protection.
Background
Before examining specific agricultural and social protec-
tion policies in terms of their evolution and outcomes, 
it is important to place these in context. We focus on 
three particular (and inter-related) aspects of context, 
the political context (as this affects the policy choices 
that politicians make), the economic context (as this 
affects the policy demands, resources and hence options), 
and the agricultural and rural livelihood context (as this 
affects the policy demands and policy outcomes).  A 
broad historical understanding is critical in understanding 
these contexts, and table 1 sets out major pertinent 
events since 1990/91. 
The Economic Context
With more than 55% of its rural population in poverty 
and 24% ultra-poor in 2004/5 (National Statistical Office, 
2005, and GNI per capita of around 170 US$, Malawi is 
one of the poorest countries in the world, as evidenced 
by a range of social and economic indicators (see table 
2). Many people in Malawi are characterized by high levels 
of vulnerability, due to the fragility of their livelihoods, 
susceptibility to shocks, and large numbers of non-poor 
people living just above the poverty line (Devereux et 
al., 2006).
There are many elements in the poor performance of 
the Malawian economy. Some of these represent long 
term generic features of the country which have not 
changed over the last 40 years or so since independence, 
despite major (if somewhat erratic) investments and 
policies to address them.  These include high depend-
ence on agriculture; low productivity in production of 
maize (the dominant staple crop which accounts for 
around 70% of cultivated area);  lack of other exploitable 
natural resources; isolation and high import and export 
costs due to its land- locked location and poor external 
transport systems; poor physical infrastructure; chronic 
poor health, with very high infant mortality from malaria, 
water-borne diseases, and mal- and under-nutrition; and 
low levels of literacy and education1. Other elements have 
emerged more recently as a result of development fail-
ures or wider economic, social and natural processes. 
These include high population densities and small land 
holdings, falling soil fertility, high rates of HIV/AIDS infec-
tion, morbidity and mortality; and depressed world prices 
for traditional export crops. A further set of problems 
emerged from the mid 1990s due to policy and govern-
ance failures, and these include the collapse of the indus-
trial economy due to exposure to outside competition; 
poor macro-economic management with large budget 
deficits, high interest rates, large devaluations of the 
Malawi Kwacha (MK), and high inflation rates; high crime 
rates in urban and rural areas; and weak governance2. 
Some of these latter problems, particularly problems 
of poor macro-economic management, are being 
addressed, following a change in government since 2004. 
This points to the need for understanding agricultural 
and social protection policies in Malawi in the context 
of wider political change in Malawi.
 
The Political Context
Booth et al., 2006 argue that Malawian politics is best 
understood in terms of neo-patrimonialism where poli-
tics is centred around the president who uses the power 
and resources of the state to dispense patronage to 
sustain political power. It is helpful to consider here a 
simple distinction between three different patronage 
client groups which have, at different times, been impor-
tant in Malawi: the political elite, the middle classes, and 
the wider masses in the population. Regional dimensions 
are also important, in garnering the ongoing support of 
regional elites and, in the run up to elections, of regional 
masses. Instruments for dispensing patronage are the 
design and implementation of policies and projects, in 
as far as these mobilize resources, yield benefits or show-
case commitment for different class and regional interest 
groups over different time periods. 
The political context of agricultural and social protec-
tion policies in Malawi is best explained in relation to the 
periods of tenure of the three presidents of Malawi since 
independence: Kamuzu Banda (from 1964 to 1994), Bakili 
Mluzi (from 1994 to 2004), and Bingu Mutharika (the 
current President, elected in 2004). 
The first president of Malawi, Kamuzu Banda, held the 
reigns of power for thirty years from independence in 
1964 until he was ousted in democratic elections in 1994. 
He presided over a highly personalized and repressive 
regime. Booth et al., 2006 consider two phases of policy 
under Banda, the first delivering quite rapid economic 
growth but achieving this through a set of ultimately 
economically and politically unsustainable policies. These 
focussed on the development of highly import dependent 
estate agriculture producing tobacco while the small-
holder sector grew much more slowly4 and was restricted 
to cultivation of food crops and low value cash crops, 
while providing a low cost labour reserve for estate agri-
culture. Banda used the promotion of tobacco (Malawi’s 
‘green gold’) in the estate sector as an important means 
of dispensing political patronage to elites and emerging 
middle class based primarily in the central and, with time, 
in the northern regions. Middle class support was also 
garnered by investments in secondary and higher educa-
tion and by growth in civil service employment, while 
mass support rested upon large scale visible investments 
in a variety of infrastructural and development projects, 
including fertilizer and credit subsidies, and a commit-
ment to deliver national food security. Estate and small-
holder agriculture were highly regulated, with a high 
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degree of state intervention through generally effective 
parastatals and government ministries. Booth et al., 2006 
characterize Banda’s approach in this period as ‘patronage 
following policy’. There was little explicit attention to 
social protection in this policy phase as government and 
the Malawi Congress Party played down the existence 
of chronic poverty.
The fragility of the growth developed under these 
policies became apparent when the economy was hit 
by a number of external shocks in the early 1980s. The 
government was then forced to recognize the need for 
different polices and to seek financial assistance, with 
policy conditions, from the IMF and World Bank. Malawi 
consequently entered its second post independence 
policy phase, of liberalization. Policies then looked to 
increase smallholder export crop production by 
increasing farmgate prices while holding down maize 
(food) prices (Harrigan, 2003) and this encouraged the 
substitution of smallholder maize production by cash 
crops which, with removal of fertilizer subsidies and 
unsuccessful market reforms, resulted in a food crisis in 
1987, with rapid increases in maize prices. Banda’s sense 
of responsibility in delivering food self sufficiency to the 
country (and his vulnerability to growing calls for political 
change and the failure of an important part of his mass 
patronage) led to policy reversals and the reintroduction 
of fertilizer subsidies and government intervention in 
maize markets. Despite a positive maize production 
response to these policy changes, maize shortages 
continued with two severe droughts in the 1992-1994 
period. At the same time access to patronage from 
tobacco was extended to a much larger part of the middle 
classes, primarily in the central and northern regions, 
through the promotion of large numbers of small scale 
tobacco estates. 
Following the transition to multi-party democracy and 
presidential elections in 1994, Malawi’s second president, 
Bakili Muluzi, served two terms of office, from 1994 to 
2004. A major change in agricultural policy in the mid 
1990s was the repeal of the Special Crops Act, which had 
restricted smallholder cultivation of some crops, most 
notably burley tobacco. The liberalization of burley 
tobacco production was extremely successful, with rapid 
growth in the number of smallholders growing the crop, 
and without (initially at least) expected declines in quality 
(Harrigan, 2003). However the 10 years from 1994 were 
characterised by severe macro-economic mismanage-
ment, rampant inflation, dramatic falls in the value of 
the Malawi Kwacha, and a weakening of government 
capacity. Opportunistic privatization, funding diversions 
and the issue of bonds to finance budget deficits became 
an important source of patronage for a primarily southern 
region elite with commercial rather than agricultural 
interests, so that short term financial interests of politi-
cians drove policy with ‘policies following patronage’ 
(Booth et al., 2006). As the real value of civil service salaries 
collapsed, middle class patronage involved what Booth 
et al., 2006 describe as the ‘democratization’ of corruption. 
With the government’s political power base in the south 
of the country (in contrast to Banda’s base in the less 
populous centre), and with stagnation of the economy, 
growing land pressure in the south, declining soil fertility 
and experience of wider use of fertiliser in the early 1990s, 
the politics and mass patronage of maize self sufficiency 
became associated with the politics of fertilizer subsidies. 
In 1998 the UDF government introduced the universal 
provision of small packs of maize seed and fertilizer under 
the starter pack programme. This will be described and 
discussed in more detail later, but we note here the popu-
list political roots of this programme and ambiguity as 
to its role in promoting agricultural development, social 
protection and/or short term political patronage objec-
tives . 
‘Fertiliser politics’ has subsequently become a major 
feature of Malawi. In the 2004 presidential election, in 
which President Bingu Mutharika was elected, the two 
major parties both campaigned with promises of different 
forms of fertiliser subsidy. Fertiliser subsidies have 
continued to be a major political issue in subsequent 
political manoeuvring associated with the President’s 
breaking away from former president Muluzi to form his 
own party. The new government has also placed a major 
emphasis on improving macro-economic management 
and Booth et al., 2006 appear to be  borne out in their 
suggestion that President Mutharika’s term would be in 
some ways “be closer to the Banda tradition than to 
Muluzi’s, with patronage being subordinated to an overall 
vision”.
Understanding agricultural and social protection 
policy changes in Malawi also requires an understanding 
of changing donor interventions (Harrigan, 2003; 
Chinsinga, 2006; Chinsinga, 2007). These were very 
supportive of agricultural policies in the first phase of 
dualistic policy described above, making very large 
investments in integrated rural development projects. 
Concerns about the problems of Malawi’s dualistic and 
interventionist policies, as regards both economic vulner-
abilities and constraints on smallholder development, 
then came to the fore at the same time as a wider shift 
in ideology to structural adjustment and the Washington 
consensus. This was a major driver of the liberalization 
policies in Malawi as it took on structural adjustment 
loans in the early 1980s. Harrigan, 2003 then describes 
a series of ‘U turns’ by the World Bank in agreeing to the 
reintroduction of fertilizer subsidies and then later 
insisting on their removal and opposing their re-intro-
duction under the start pack programme. Chinsinga, 
2006 describes more recent differences between donors 
and changes in individual donor positions. These posi-
tions have been driven by domestic donor politics, 
economic ideology, humanitarian concerns, and personal 
concerns of often short term in-country staff. Changing 
donor policies have been important because (a) they 
have suffered frequent changes and inconsistencies, and 
(b) they have been unduly influential as a result both of 
the high dependence of the Malawian economy on 
foreign aid and of weaknesses (particularly under Muluzi) 
in government capacity and commitment to articulate 
consistent policies. 
A number of important insights emerge from this 
discussion. We note that the use by different presidents 
of different approaches to delivering patronage to client 
groups with different regional interests has been a core 
determinant of the prominence and resources given to 
agricultural policies and of the nature of these polices. 
A major challenge which both Banda and Muluzi faced 
Working Paper 007 www.future-agricultures.org5
in this was the need to deliver short term patronage 
without compromising longer term capacity of the 
economy to support such patronage. Thus ‘patronage 
policies’ were critical in the promotion of agricultural 
policies and investment under Banda, while failures by 
the policies in dealing with core poverty/ vulnerability 
and food security problems led to their demise. Conversely 
the failure of ‘commerce based’ patronage polices under 
Muluzi has led to a resurgent interest in fertilizer subsi-
dies. This ebb and flow of political interest in agriculture 
has revolved around the different regional and patronage 
group interests in food, fertilizer and tobacco and has at 
times coincided with and at times conflicted with a 
different pattern of changing interests among donors. 
Social protection has featured in this only in the pursuit 
of food security in the agriculture/food security/fertilizer 
nexus and in the provision of relief during food crises: 
Chinsinga, 2007 notes that although it is a pillar in the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, the develop-
ment of wider social protection policy in Malawi has been 
a largely donor driven process and has not involved 
political debate or processes.
We also note that an entirely appropriate and legiti-
mate political preoccupation with food security arises 
not because of the dominance of the rural population 
in Malawi but because food security is an important 
preoccupation for poor people, whether urban or rural, 
who spend a large proportion of their income on staple 
foods and who are very vulnerable to price changes. The 
emphasis on fertilizer subsidies as a response to food 
insecurity, however, is determined by recognition that 
(a) high price volatility in relation to domestic supply 
shocks is a result of lack of integration of national and 
international maize markets (due to poor international 
transport links, and there are also foreign exchange 
constraints), (b) that the majority of poor food insecure 
people and of the electorate, particularly in the south, 
are rural deficit producers facing particular constraints 
in accessing fertilizers, (c) that less poor rural people also 
face difficulties in accessing fertilizer but have an interest 
in fertilizer access for the production of food and non-
food cash crops, and (d) most urban people have strong 
links with rural people and rural interests. Core to the 
importance of fertilizers in the food security narrative, 
therefore, is an understanding of market failures in 
serving rural livelihoods, an understanding which has 
been shared by Malawian politicians and technocrats 
– but often not by donors. This difference in under-
standing of market failures has been an important reason 
for government / donor disagreements regarding instru-
ments for pursuing the social protection and agriculture 
agendas of donors and the mass patronage and agricul-
ture development agendas of domestic politics even 
where their interests in these agendas appear to converge. 
We therefore now turn to consider briefly key features 
of markets and livelihoods in rural Malawi.
The Markets and Livelihood 
Context
There are two important features of rural markets and 
livelihoods in Malawi that are relevant to our analysis of 
agriculture and social protection policy.
First major interactions arise between agriculture and 
social protection because of the major importance of 
small scale, low productivity and risky agriculture in the 
livelihoods of poor rural people. While agriculture is by 
no means the only source of income of poor rural people, 
it is critically important to their livelihoods. There are 
surprisingly few empirical estimates of the proportion 
of rural Malawians’ income coming from own farm activi-
ties. National Statistical Office, 2005 estimate agricultural 
activities as comprising 50% of rural household incomes 
and 55% of the lowest income quartile for rural and urban 
households, and these estimates  are consistent with the 
commonly cited figure of 50% of income being farm 
income in different parts of Africa (Ellis, 1998; Reardon, 
1998; Jayne et al., 2001).  Dorward, 2006 estimated figures 
of 33% own farm income in 1998 (closer to  figures of 20 
to 45% in different southern Africa case studies cited by 
Bryceson, 1999, although more recent analysis suggests 
own farm incomes of 50% or more in two different rural 
areas, but around 40% among poorer households 
(Dorward, 2007). Such figures underestimate the wider 
importance of agriculture in rural livelihoods, however. 
First, food expenditures are estimated to account for just 
over 61% of total expenditures in the lowest income 
quintile in the rural population in 2004 (National Statistical 
Office, 2005). A large part of the 50% or more non-own 
farm income of poor people is also derived from employ-
ment on other people’s farms and from providing services 
to other rural people whose incomes and demand for 
services are also heavily dependent on agriculture 
(Dorward, 2006). This very large importance of agriculture 
coupled with the low and risky nature of smallholder 
agriculture in Malawi means that agriculture is a major 
source of vulnerability in rural livelihoods. This is illus-
trated by examining the shocks that rural people reported 
had severely affected them in the period 1999/2000 to 
2004/5, as shown in table 3. Similar results were found 
in another nationally representative but smaller sample 
survey conducted in 2007, reported in table 4.
In the survey reported in table 4, households reported 
on shocks over the previous three years. In the 2007 
survey two extra categories of shock or stress were added 
to the list about which respondents were asked (‘lower 
crop yields due to poor soil fertility’ and ‘reduced ganyu 
opportunities’). What is striking about these tables is the 
very high proportion of rural households affected by a 
range of food and agricultural shocks: from 1999/2000 
to 2004/5 the two most (and very) common shocks and 
five of the seven most important shocks were related to 
food and agriculture. Similarly from 2005 to 2007, gener-
ally good agricultural years, six of the seven most impor-
tant reported shocks or stresses were related to food and 
agriculture. Social protection – whether provisioning, 
preventive, promotional or transformational – must 
therefore be concerned with agriculture, and vice 
versa.
The second major feature of rural markets and liveli-
hoods in Malawi relevant to our analysis of agriculture 
and social protection policy is the very low levels of 
market development and economic activity. 
Dorward and Kydd, 2004 argue that a defining char-
acteristic of rural areas in Malawi is that low and fragile 
incomes and low demand lead to limited market activity 
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based on very small transactions. The dependence on a 
relatively narrow range of risky and low productivity 
activities, which leads to increased covariant risk and 
vulnerability in the economy within which rural liveli-
hoods are located, is exacerbated by poor infrastructure, 
services and communications, with poor roads and trans-
port services and poor telecommunications, leading to 
high costs in physical movement of goods and services 
in and out of rural areas, together with high costs of 
communication about market opportunities and 
prices.
The result of the low general level of economic activity, 
of the risks from lack of diversification, and of poor 
communications, is thin markets, with very low traded 
volumes of key commodities, manufactures and services 
(notably agricultural produce, agricultural inputs and 
agricultural finance). Thin markets are both a cause of 
and are caused by high costs and risks in trading small 
volumes in small transactions, requiring high risk 
premiums and margins to make it profitable to engage 
in markets. However these high margins themselves 
depress demand, and the result is a low level equilibrium 
trap and market failure Kydd and Dorward, 2004. These 
problems are particularly acute in input, output and 
financial markets needed for intensification and increased 
maize productivity.
This analysis has important implications for under-
standing livelihood constraints and vulnerability, and in 
the design and implementation of agricultural and social 
protection policies and instruments. It identifies low 
levels of rural market development as both a key 
constraint to development and livelihood security on 
the one hand, and a result of poverty and vulnerability 
on the other. This then suggests that without the exist-
ence of established and functioning thick markets, 
markets cannot be relied on to deliver agricultural and 
food delivery services. Two major questions emerge from 
this:
how can agricultural service markets (principally for  •
inputs and credit) and food   markets be developed in 
the medium to long term? 
how can agricultural services and food access be  •
provided in the short term in a way that crowds in 
rather than crowds out market development?
These questions interact strongly with the political 
context discussed earlier and in particular with the 
different interests and ideologies of technocrats, politi-
cians and donors: in the first phase of policy under Banda 
there was a consensus recognising these questions, and 
development and patronage interests in agricultural and 
social protection policy complemented each other. 
Subsequent agricultural liberalisation policies involved 
lack of agreement regarding these questions (generally 
between the predominant Malawian analysis on the one 
hand and donor analysis on the other, but also between 
donors) and hence policy conflict and reversals as 
different views have prevailed. A more pragmatic 
consensus appears to have been emerging more recently 
across the different actors in Malawi, but the two ques-
tions outlined above are at the heart of (a) debates about 
agricultural and social protection policies, and (b) signifi-
cant interest in potential synergies and conflicts between 
agricultural and social protection policies.
Agricultural and Social 
Protection Policies
We now explore in more detail the major agricultural 
and social protection policies pursued in Malawi over 
the last 40 years or so in the changing economic, political 
and livelihood contexts discussed. We structure this using 
Dorward et al., 2006’s classification of four agricultural/ 
social protection policies relations: social protection from 
agriculture, social protection independent of agriculture, 
social protection for agriculture, and social protection 
through agriculture. However we add, optimistically 
perhaps, a further category of social protection with 
agriculture. Discussion on each is linked to the political 
and market/ livelihood contexts discussed above, policy 
impacts (intended and actual) on livelihoods (in terms 
of provision, prevention, promotion and transformation), 
and synergies and conflicts between agricultural and 
social protection policies, instruments and impacts.
Social protection from 
agriculture
The pre-liberalization policies for smallholder develop-
ment promoted under President Banda up to the early 
1980s are a prima facie example of policies with implicit 
Shock %  r u r a l 
house-
holds 
affected
Large rise in price of food 79.2
Lower crop yields due to drought or 
floods 
68.8
I l lness or accident of household 
member 
48.1
Large fall in sale prices for crops 42.5
Death of other family member of 
household 
42.1
Livestock died or stolen 37.1
Crop disease or crop pests 26.3
H o u s e h o l d  b u s i n e s s  f a i l u r e 
non-agricultural 
22.1
Theft 20.2
Birth in the household 12.2
Dwelling damaged or destroyed 11.2
Break-up of the household 10.4
Death of working member of household 9.6
Loss of salaried employment or non-pay-
ment of salary 
7.8
End of regular assistance aid or 
remittances 
7.7
Other 5.6
Death of household head 5
Source: National Statistical Office, 2005, p136
Table 3. Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks, 2000 to 2004
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or explicit promotion of social protection from agriculture 
as described by Dorward et al., 2006. Subsequent agri-
cultural policies in Malawi have been strongly influenced 
by these early policies, but have seldom been imple-
mented with the same coherence or resources.
Post independence smallholder agricultural develop-
ment policy revolved around the establishment and then 
scaling up and out of four large donor financed integrated 
rural development projects (one in the northern region, 
two in the centre and one in the south) to a national 
programme of projects covering the majority of the 
country. Although elements varied between projects, 
there were a number of common core activities: agricul-
tural extension; financing and supply of improved seeds 
and fertilisers for maize and cash crops; construction of 
feeder roads and market facilities; construction of offices 
and staff housing; and construction of health facilities. 
Within the context of supporting infrastructure, the core 
of smallholder agricultural development involved the 
promotion of farming groups which were then able to 
take input loans, receiving the loans in kind and repaying 
the loans when selling their produce, through inter-
locking arrangements involving the parastatal market 
board, ADMARC. The system was very successful in 
expanding access to purchased inputs, particularly in 
maize production, and in achieving very high rates of 
credit repayment. Fundamental to this success were (a) 
the role of the parastatal marketing agency, ADMARC, 
as a sole seller of inputs to smallholder and sole buyer 
of produce from them, (b) facilitation of this system being 
a major role for extension staff, which consumed most 
of their time, (c) strict enforcement of penalties for non 
repayment, such penalties being the denial of access to 
all members of a defaulting group of input purchases 
not only on credit but also for cash and, in some cases, 
heavy handed confiscation of assets of defaulters. 
ADMARC also maintained pan territorial and pan-sea-
sonal prices.
These policies had complex anti-poor and pro-poor 
elements (Chirwa et al., 2006). The interests of the poor 
were damaged by food prices frequently being held 
above import parity, and cheaper imported food prices 
might have allowed the large number of malnourished 
poor better access to food in some years (although lower 
maize prices would have depressed incentives for invest-
ment in improved seed and fertiliser use in maize). 
ADMARC also tended to tax the smallholder sector, and 
the proceeds of this were transferred to the estate sector, 
which also benefited from cheap labour in an exploitative 
tenant system of tobacco production.
However the smallholder development projects 
described above invested considerable sums in rural 
areas, and although the direct beneficiaries of the agri-
cultural programmes were generally (but not always) 
less poor farmers, they did promote national food self 
sufficiency and local food availability (both through local 
production and through the network of ADMARC markets 
which sold maize) and stimulate economic growth in 
rural areas. Smallholder taxation was also mainly of cash 
crops and the smallholder maize system was moderately 
subsidised by ADMARC (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982). 
Smallholder taxation was also offset and with time 
eclipsed by government infrastructural investment in 
the IRDPs described above and by the implicit subsidies 
in the support of groups in obtaining credit and in 
marketing their produce.
This set of agricultural policies can be seen as setting 
up a system that addressed many of the demands made 
of it. Support for estates provided direct patronage to 
elites (and resources for dispensing patronage) and to 
emerging middle classes as noted earlier, particularly in 
the central region. Donor resources supported small-
holder agricultural development that provided infra-
structure and  agricultural services and food access to 
smallholders (addressing the market development trap), 
thus meeting donor developmental objectives and 
government developmental and patronage objectives, 
the latter being achieved by regionally distributed visible 
project investments, with civil service and parastatal 
employment, improved incomes to less poor farmers, 
and stable food availability in rural areas. The major social 
protection outcomes of these policies were stable pan 
territorial, pan seasonal food prices, and reliable food 
availability in most rural areas in the country. It is also 
possible to recognise other potential synergies in terms 
of social protection contributions from these agricultural 
Table 4. Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
Shock %  r u r a l 
households 
affected
Lower crop yields due to poor soil 
fertility
33.3%
Short acute illness/ accident of H 
member
24.3%
Lower crop yields due to drought or 
floods
23.3%
Large rise in price of food 19.9%
Livestock died or were stolen 18.6%
Crop disease of crop pests 13.0%
Reduced ganyu opportunities 11.3%
Theft 11.2%
Increased expenditure demand 7.3%
Large fall in sales prices for crops 7.2%
Death of household member 5.5%
Dwelling damaged, destroyed 5.3%
Chronic illness, disability 4.9%
Household business failure, non-agr 4.9%
Birth in the household 4.0%
Breakup of the household 3.1%
Other 2.2%
Marriage/other social events 1.8%
End of regular assistance, aid or remit-
tances from outside household
1.5%
Loss of salaried employment or non-
payment of salaries
1.4%
Source: Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Survey, 2007
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policies, although as noted above it must be recognised 
that the direct beneficiaries of these policies were not 
generally the poorer members of rural communities and 
differences between regions in the benefits produced 
by these policies are likely. Nevertheless both the flow 
of seasonal finance to less poor households and the 
increased incomes arising from the use of those inputs 
(and their multiplier effects) should have increased 
seasonal liquidity in rural communities, raising demand 
and wages for casual labour, and increasing community 
resources for informal local social protection measures. 
The discussion of pro- and anti-poor elements of these 
policies, also, however, illustrates conflicts over maize 
prices (low prices are good for poor, food insecure 
consumers but high prices are needed to stimulate 
investment), while the longer term failure of the govern-
ment to sustain these policies illustrates the difficulties 
governments face in allocating limited resources between 
the short term demands for distribution of benefits to 
different interest groups on the one hand and longer 
term demands for investment in growth on the other. 
Social protection inde-
pendent of agriculture
As liberalisation and later multi-party democracy and 
currency devaluation led to the demise of the inter-
locking smallholder agricultural credit system and inte-
grated rural development approach at the core of the 
agricultural policies described above, subsequent agri-
cultural policies were not seen as part of such a compre-
hensive vision of rural development. Agriculture, and 
indeed individual crops, were seen as needing market 
solutions, and these were more crop and commodity 
specific. The best example of this is probably the devel-
opment of smallholder tobacco, which, as discussed 
earlier, was very successful. Harrigan, 2003, reports a 
number of benefits from this expansion: a major cash 
injection with multipliers feeding through into the rest 
of the non-farm rural economy, the use of tobacco 
income to buy seed and fertilizer for maize production, 
and market development. However she also notes that 
middle income smallholders were the predominant 
direct beneficiaries, and while there were significant 
numbers of poorer smallholders with very limited land 
growing tobacco, tobacco began to crowd out maize on 
these farms. This led to severe declines in maize produc-
tion when devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha and the 
removal of input subsidies made use of fertilizer on maize 
un-economic, while growth in smallholder tobacco 
production has been mainly in the central and northern 
regions, not in the southern region where holdings are 
smallest and the extent, incidence and severity of poverty 
are greatest (Prowse, 2007, National Statistical Office, 
2005). 
A variety of social protection instruments were then 
introduced. Initially mainly safety nets, these reflected 
both poor rural Malawians’ need for safety nets in the 
context of increased food insecurity and increasing 
vulnerability from, inter alia, declining holding sizes and 
soil fertility and the spread of HIV/AIDS. With time a wide 
variety of different social protection programmes and 
instruments have been implemented (Slater and Tsoka, 
2007). The  most common instruments that could be 
considered in the  category ‘independent of agriculture’ 
were targeted nutrition programmes, food transfers, 
public works programmes, school feeding programmes, 
credit transfers,  and more recently cash transfers. 
However some of these may be designed to deliver direct 
benefits to agriculture in a community or to individual 
farm households in  terms of public works on agricultural 
infrastructure (such as irrigation works, or even roads) 
but the quality of such work needs to improve (Slater 
and Tsoka, 2007). 
The agricultural synergies and conflicts of many of 
these programmes are well known: injections of cash 
and food into people’s livelihoods can make a critical 
contribution at lean times of year before harvest when 
labour is needed by people to work on their fields, and 
may allow them to work on their fields rather than seek 
work for cash or food elsewhere. However cash or food 
for work programmes face a dilemma in that if they are 
providing work and income at the time when people 
need it most, then this will take people from their fields 
and undermine their own production (Slater and Tsoka, 
2007).These programmes also face wider problems 
regarding the extent and value of their contributions to 
rural assets and most importantly to the livelihoods of 
participants (Devereux and MacAuslan, 2006). The various 
safety net programmes have had a variety of mixes of 
provision, protection and promotion objectives (the 
latter often in terms of promoting education and health), 
but a tendency for programmes to lack long term funding 
and consistency has undermined the extent to which 
they can be relied upon by rural households and allow 
poor households to undertake potentially risky invest-
ments  (Slater and Tsoka, 2007). 
A study on the multiplier effects of a Concern 
Worldwide cash transfer programme in Malawi found a 
significant multiplier effect of 2.11 from the cash 
programme (Davies, 2007). In terms of who gains, the 
study revealed that local commerce and village traders 
were significant winners with many people purchasing 
goods from these two groups. The study found that 
smallholder farmers gained more from the programme 
than their larger counterparts because they were able 
to source traders from this increased demand (ibid). 
Seasonal price volatility also has implications for the 
implementation of social protection programming, 
particularly cash transfers. Typically cash transfer 
programmes or cash-for-work programmes provide a 
set rate per month per household member; however, in 
cases where food prices are rising, particularly in emer-
gency situations, the purchasing power of the transfer 
can quickly be eroded, undermining household food 
security. A recent transfer programme in Malawi by 
Concern Worldwide provides an innovative example of 
how social protection instruments can be adjusted to 
respond to seasonal food price changes. The FACT 
programme included a combination of both food and 
cash transfers, with the cash portion of the payment 
adjusted for household size and linked with the price of 
food stables. Overall the programme was successful in 
smoothing food consumption during the food crisis as 
well as protecting households from costly coping strate-
gies (Devereux, 2006). A purely cash programme was 
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also implemented by Oxfam GB during the same time 
period which also found that cash allowed beneficiaries 
to smooth consumption as well as purchase agricultural 
inputs. However, unlike the FACT programme, the cash 
amounts were not adjusted for food inflation which 
impacted households’ ability to access food, namely a 
trade-based entitlement failure (Harvey and Savage, 
2006).
Devereux notes that although cash transfers in the 
FACT programme can mitigate the effects of seasonality 
on poor people, they can also exacerbate seasonal food 
price inflation and do not address deeper structural 
problems in production, markets, policies and govern-
ance (Devereux, 2007).
Social protection for 
agriculture
New interest in the potential for social protection 
reducing risk in people’s livelihoods and allowing them 
to take higher yielding but more risky investments to 
escape poverty have led to a resurgence of interest in 
different forms of insurance. The importance of agricul-
ture and agricultural risks in rural livelihoods in Malawi 
leads to an interest in agricultural insurance. Although 
never widely pursued in Malawi, very large agricultural 
insurance schemes were tried in Asia and Latin America 
in the 1960s and 70s but due to covariant risk, moral 
hazard, high transaction costs and political economy 
problems, these were generally extremely costly and 
offered little benefit to poorer farmers (Hazell et al., 1986). 
Agricultural insurance schemes then fell out of favour. 
More recently, however, a rediscovery in social protection 
analysis of the importance of risk as a deadweight on 
poor people’s livelihoods has coincided with the devel-
opment of new micro-finance and weather index 
approaches to insurance, and to a revival of interest in 
agricultural insurance. 
In Malawi, the Government in partnership with the 
World Bank partnered with Opportunity International 
and the National Smallholder Farmers Association of 
Malawi (NASFAM) to develop a pilot weather-indexed 
crop insurance in 2005/2006. The insurance product was 
sold in a few districts to approximately 900 smallholder 
farmers and involved only one crop, groundnuts. Through 
the scheme, farmers entered into a loan agreement with 
an interest rate that includes a weather insurance 
premium. The loan enabled households to access an 
input package which included improved groundnut 
seed. The insurance payout is based on a cumulative 
rainfall index set at three specific dates throughout the 
growing season. If rainfall levels fall below the set trigger, 
there is an immediate payout based on the proportion 
of the rainfall shortfall. In the event of a severe drought, 
the borrower would pay only a fraction of the loan due, 
while the rest is paid by the insurer directly to the lender. 
Because the insurance functions as a guarantee against 
the loan, high-risk and low-income farmers are able to 
obtain the credit they need to invest in seeds and other 
inputs necessary for higher yielding crops. 
A recent evaluation following the first year of the 
Malawi programme reveals that there is a high level of 
satisfaction with the programme with 86 percent of 
surveyed farmers indicating that they would like to 
continue participation in the programme. With that said, 
a very low percentage of farmers understood the concept 
of the weather index with most of them indicating that 
they chose to join the programme because it facilitated 
access to credit and improved ground nut seeds (Suarez 
et al., 2007).
The programme has attracted considerable interest. 
However it is important to note that it is supporting provi-
sion of input credit in cash crop production. Valuable 
though this can be in promoting cash crop production, 
with important developmental benefits in the areas 
where cash crop production (or potential) is important, 
it is difficult to see how the approach can be extended 
to address risks faced in maize production by the poor 
and to promote greater input use in maize production. 
Social protection through 
agriculture
As discussed earlier, recognition within Malawi of the 
importance of agriculture for food security, of the need 
for fertilizers to raise yields for poor farmers with small-
holdings and declining yields under continuous maize 
cropping, and of difficulties in accessing maize seed and 
inputs have led to major political, economic and devel-
opmental interests in social protection instruments 
aimed at increasing poor people’s access to agricultural 
inputs (seed and fertilizer) for maize production.  In this 
and the following section we review three different 
programmes and instruments concerned with input 
delivery to poor people: inputs for work, free input distri-
bution, and a voucher based input subsidy. These 
programmes have operated at different scales and in 
different ways, and we characterize them according to 
dominant perceptions of their objectives, but recognize 
that these perceptions vary, and hence the distinction 
between social protection ‘through’ and ‘with’ agriculture 
may not be clear cut. Making the distinction is neverthe-
less useful, as it highlights the different objectives of 
stakeholders in supporting different programmes. As we 
shall see, ambiguity and diversity in understandings of 
programme objectives has been widespread, and had 
both benefits and costs. 
‘Inputs for work’ describes the use of public works 
programmes to deliver social protection but in contrast 
to food for work and cash for work programmes, partici-
pants are paid with agricultural inputs. Compared to free 
input distribution and input subsidies, inputs for work 
has only been implemented on a local scale implemented 
by NGOs with donor funding, generally with explicit 
social protection rather than agricultural development 
objectives. Payment with inputs is intended to overcome 
some of the difficulties with food and cash for work 
programmes by providing participants with work during 
the dry season, when there is little competition for labour 
with work on their fields, but this provides benefits during 
the following cropping season (by easing labour and 
cash demands for households looking to find cash with 
which to purchase fertilizer) and/or during the cropping 
season in the following year, by increasing the maize 
harvest and hence food stocks during that season. An 
evaluation of a pilot project in two districts of Malawi 
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cited by Devereux and MacAuslan, 2006 concluded that 
the project was more popular with participants than food 
or cash for work, and yielded a very favourable return in 
the value of increased maize produced. 
Free input distribution has been a much more widely 
used approach to extending access to inputs across the 
country, with large scale government distributions 
starting from 1993 in response to currency devaluation, 
the removal of fertiliser subsidies, the collapse of the 
credit system for maize inputs, and drought (Devereux 
and MacAuslan, 2006). In 1998, the government imple-
mented a universal ‘Starter Pack’ programme, under 
which every smallholder was provided with enough 
seeds and fertiliser to plant 0.1 hectares of land. This, 
with good weather, was a contributor to an estimated 
increase of 67 percent increase in maize output, with 
maize production reaching 2.5 million tonnes (Levy, 
2005). The Starter Pack programme was funded by DFID 
and was continued in 1999, but was highly 
controversial.
Controversy with the Starter Pack (and subsequent 
targeted programmes) was rooted in the different stake-
holder interests and the political context discussed 
earlier, related to different perceptions of its objectives. 
As originally conceived, the Starter Pack was not a social 
protection instrument but an agricultural development 
programme. It was intended to include legume and 
maize seed and fertiliser, and it was intended to be 
accompanied by a strong extension programme and be 
implemented in a way that would promote farmer skills 
in more intensive maize production and in diversification 
out of maize and would also encourage the growth of 
commercial input distribution systems in rural areas. It 
was therefore an agricultural development intervention 
that was intended to address the market and livelihood 
constraints discussed earlier. The likely effectiveness of 
different elements of the programme in addressing these 
constraints can be debated. In fact the programme was 
funded and implemented more as a social protection 
programme, with major emphasis on fertiliser provision 
to promote food production, and less emphasis on agri-
cultural education, provision of legume seed, or the 
development of commercial input delivery systems. The 
programme was highly politicised, coming just before 
the 1999 presidential elections, and was seen as particu-
larly beneficial for the southern region, the ruling party’s 
power base.
Donors were concerned about the politicisation of 
the programme, its high cost, its apparent emphasis on 
maize rather than on promoting diversification, its effects 
on input markets, and its efficiency as regards targeting 
and benefits to the poor. There was concern that large 
numbers of non-poor people were benefiting, and that 
receipt of inputs by such people was simply a transfer, 
with starter pack inputs displacing commercial purchases, 
although the extent of displacement is disputed. As a 
result DFID support of the programme in subsequent 
years was scaled back to the Targeted Input Programme 
(TIP).
Targeting, however, faced problems. There were 
considerable difficulties in the selection of beneficiaries 
and in the effectiveness of targeting. More fundamen-
tally, however, Levy, 2005 argues that starter pack assisted 
poorer households in two ways, by increasing their own 
maize production and, by stimulating national maize 
production, reducing maize prices. The second benefit 
was lost when the programme was scaled back to a 
targeted programme. Dorward and Kydd, 2005 simulate 
the effects of maize price and wage effects of the universal 
starter pack and compare this with effects under a 
targeted programme, and argue that even if targeting 
cold be achieved without exclusion and inclusion prob-
lems, and ignoring the increased costs associated with 
targeting, but ignoring displacement effects, the wage 
and maize price effects of a universal subsidy could be 
more cost effective than a targeted programme in deliv-
ering welfare benefits to the target group. They were 
concerned, however, that by depressing maize prices, 
the universal programme ‘may undermine the important 
growth contributions of less poor households that 
engage in more intensive labour demanding maize-
production’ (pp.274).  
A wider point emerges from this, that where markets 
are thin and not working properly then market based 
approaches to food security will not work in poor rural 
economies (as demonstrated in Malawi’s 2001/2002 
crisis).  Dorward and Kydd, 2005 argue that the Malawian 
market and livelihood context requires a temporal 
approach to food security and poverty reduction which 
takes account of the need for both initial provision of 
market services and longer term market development 
as illustrated in table 5.
In the short term, food security requires policies to 
work in the absence of effective markets, with an impor-
tant role for protective and provisioning social protection 
instruments which do not rely on markets. Productivity 
enhancing safety nets are likely to play an important 
role.
in the medium-term there is a need to develop effec- •
tive markets while maintaining short term protective 
measures; 
in the longer term, once markets and firms are well  •
established, then market-based social protection 
measures policies can be relied upon for both social 
protection and to promote rural growth. 
There are important lessons here for the relationship 
between social protection and agricultural development 
policies, in that this relationship, and the types of policies 
and instruments needed,  differ between  countries and 
regions at different stages of development and with 
different levels of economic activity and market develop-
ment.  This means that lessons from areas with different 
characteristics should be applied with great caution to 
other areas with different conditions – for example it 
cannot be assumed that market solutions working in 
countries which have already undergone some rural 
growth.  Lessons from successful market based 
programmes in Latin America or Asia therefore cannot 
be applied in many African countries without funda-
mental questions about the appropriateness of market 
based instruments in the poorer and less developed rural 
economies found in many African countries. It also means 
that successful development requires complex transi-
tions not only in policy objectives but in the nature of 
instruments, most notably in a switch from more non-
m a r k e t  t o  m a r k e t  b a s e d  i n s t r u m e n t s . 
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Particular challenges here are that in the early stages of 
development non-market mechanisms must be deployed 
in ways that crowd in rather than crowd out market 
development, and for this to be occur there must be 
both stability and adaptability in policy (Dorward and 
Kydd, 2004). 
Social protection with 
agriculture
High food prices and food shortages following poor 
harvests in 2000/1 and 200/2 (after the scaling back of 
the starter pack programme), led to food security and 
fertiliser subsidies becoming a major political issue in 
the lead up to the 2004 presidential elections, with both 
the major parties and their candidates promising fertiliser 
subsidies, though of different kinds. After the election 
the new government delayed the introduction of subsi-
dies, perhaps due to the need for controlling government 
expenditure to qualify for debt relief  (Chinsinga, 2006). 
Uncertainty about a subsidy led to delays in a decision 
to implement another targeted input programme, and 
also led to delays in fertiliser imports and to farmers 
delaying fertiliser purchases. The result was another poor 
season with subsequent food shortages, high prices and 
very expensive importation of maize. 
The government then decided to implement a ferti-
lizer and maize seed subsidy. A full description of the 
programme is provided in Imperial College et al., 2007. 
The stated objectives of the programme were to promote 
access to and use of fertilizers in both maize and tobacco 
production in order to increase agricultural productivity 
and food security. The subsidy was implemented through 
the distribution of coupons or vouchers which recipients 
could then redeem for any of four fertilizer types, at 
approximately one third of the normal cash price. 
6,000MT OPV maize seed were also offered for sale at a 
similar discount without coupons There was considerable 
variation between areas in the criteria determining priori-
tization and selection of beneficiaries, numbers of people 
receiving coupons, and numbers of coupons received 
per recipient household. 
All distribution of subsidised inputs was by two 
parastatals ADMARC and SFFRM who reported subsidy 
sales of 131,000 tonnes of fertiliser. No information is 
available on seed sales. The reported direct costs of the 
programme were MK7.2 billion against a budget of MK5.1 
billion, excluding overhead costs. The programme was 
not supported by donors, indeed some did not approve 
of it (Chinsinga, 2006), and was financed from the govern-
ment budget, though it should be noted that this bene-
fited from direct budgetary support. 
Imperial College et al., 2007 report estimates that 
2005/6 private sector sales were more than 50% lower 
than sales in the previous year, suggesting substantial 
displacement of commercial sales, and hence incre-
mental fertilizer use on maize as a result of the subsidy 
was estimated to be around 45,000 tonnes. This is consid-
erably less than the subsidized sales of just under 110,000 
tonnes of ‘maize fertilisers’, although recent data suggest 
that initial estimates of displacement of around 60% may 
be something of an over-estimate.  Nevertheless signifi-
cant displacement appears to have both reduced the 
benefits of the programme and led to difficulties for 
commercial input suppliers.
Coupled with good rains, the programme produced 
a bumper harvest. Despite a considerable number of 
reports of irregularities, reports which were seized on 
by opposition politicians, the programme was very 
popular, and the government proceeded to implement 
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
Policy Goals Requirements for 
Short/Medium Term 
Achievement (Policy 
purpose)
Requirements for 
Medium/Long Term Achievement (Policy purpose)
Food security : Secure & 
affordable access to food
Increased food self-suf-
ficiency (household & 
national) with food 
delivery &/or produc-
tivity enhancing safety 
nets & humanitarian 
response
Increased household & national food market access (low 
& stable cost, secure, timely) through wider entitlements 
with (mainly) market economy based safety nets & human-
itarian response
Poverty reduction: Real 
incomes of  the poor 
increased & more secure, 
through low food costs, 
higher returns to labour, & 
safety nets.
Safety nets to increase/
secure real incomes & 
develop/protect assets 
(see above)
Broad based growth with opportunities & wages for 
unskilled rural labour, low food prices, and safety net & 
humanitarian response as above
Rural economic growth: 
Increased levels of local 
economic activity, with 
stable income opportuni-
ties supporting poverty 
reduction & food security
Short/medium term 
a c h i e v e m e n t  n o t 
possible.
Macro economic stability & low interest rates; growth in 
agricultural & non agricultural sectors tightening labour 
markets and raising real incomes with stable/affordable 
food prices. Development of market economy. Initial 
growth must be achieved without depending on (non-
existent) markets or firms.
Source: Modified from Dorward and Kydd, 2005
Table 5. Policy requirements for short and long term achievements of food security, poverty 
reduction and economic growth
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it again in the following (2006/7) season, but this time 
some donors, notably DFID, came in with financial 
support to finance and encourage changes to the system 
that would promote greater involvement of the private 
sector in sales of subsidised seed and fertiliser. A total of 
175,000 tonnes of subsidised maize and tobacco ferti-
lisers were sold, with just under 50,000 tonnes of this 
sold by a limited number of private dealers with rural 
retail outlets. 4,500 tonnes of maize hybrid and OPV maize 
seed were sold, with 57% of this sold by private retailers. 
A number of innovative mechanisms were introduced 
to try to promote greater involvement of the private 
sector and greater choice for farmers. 
An independent evaluation of the programme is not 
yet completed but we highlight the following preliminary 
results (Imperial College et al., 2007), subject to 
revision:
 nationally, 54% of rural households are estimated to  •
have received coupons, and within this less poor 
households (measured by land holding and by asset 
value tercile) are somewhat more likely to receive 
coupons than poor households (48 to 50% compared 
with 38 to 39%), and among recipient households 
those receiving more coupons tended to be less poor 
than those receiving less coupons. 
the overall displacement rate for fertilisers (that is the  •
% of subsidy sales replacing commercial sales) was 
around 40 to 50%,  with apparent greater displacement 
where coupons were received by better off farmers 
and very little displacement among poorer farmers.5 
Maize prices in 2006/7 have been relatively low and  •
stable during the cropping season, and rural wage rates 
higher than in the past (more perhaps the result of the 
effects of the 2005/6 weather and subsidy than of the 
2006/7 subsidy, but nevertheless relevant to an evalu-
ation of the subsidy, as discussed later)6
Evaluation of the achievements of the programme 
are difficult given that the objectives of the programme 
are not clear, with different stakeholders in the programme 
having different perceptions of the objectives. Thus there 
is broad agreement that the objectives of the programme 
are to improve land and labour productivity and produc-
tion of both food and cash crops by cash constrained 
smallholder farmers, to promote economic growth and 
to reduce vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and 
poverty. A further objective emphasised by some is 
promotion of the development of the private sector agro 
dealer (input) network. There are, however, a variety of 
understandings about how increased food security and 
reduced hunger are promoted under the programme: 
some see food security primarily in terms of national 
food self sufficiency while others see food security in 
terms of household food self sufficiency. These different 
understandings have far reaching implications for ques-
tions about the benefits of the programme, about the 
way it should be implemented (in particular targeting), 
about its scale and about how and when it should be 
scaled down, modified and phased out.
While agricultural productivity and social protection 
feature strongly in the objectives discussed above, there 
is a notable lack of discussion on how the programme 
should contribute to longer term economic growth and 
development and sustained poverty reduction. Imperial 
College et al., 2007 argue that the market and livelihood 
conditions in rural Malawi mean that agricultural, rural 
and national economic development are constrained by 
a number of interacting poverty and productivity traps 
which themselves constrain input and maize market 
development, investments in maize intensification, diver-
sification out of maize into other agricultural and non-
agricultural activities, the ability of (particularly poor) 
rural people to protect themselves from shocks, and 
wider local and national economic development.  The 
result is a vicious circle of unstable maize prices inhibiting 
(a) net producers’ investment in maize production, (b) 
net consumers’ reliance on the market for maize 
purchases, and (c) poor consumers’ exits from low 
productivity maize cultivation. These in turn inhibit the 
growth of the non-farm economy. This vicious circle, 
illustrated in figure 1, is exacerbated by, among other 
things, unstable and changing policies, weather insta-
bility, poor road infrastructure, and constrained private 
sector development.  At the heart of this are household, 
local and national vulnerability and poverty traps. 
This analysis suggests that maize input subsidies can 
make important contributions to lower (and perhaps 
more stable) maize prices and to raising maize produc-
tivity, with the paradoxical long run objective of encour-
aging less people to grow maize, but to grow it more 
productively. For this to be achieved, however, it is impor-
tant, that a subsidy programme is not only efficiently 
and consistently implemented on a large scale, but also 
that it is supported by complementary policies that 
promote its efficiency. These are needed to prevent maize 
prices from rising in years of low harvest, to provide social 
protection to stabilize and raise real incomes of the poor, 
and to promote agricultural productivity for cash and 
oil grain/ legume crops through research and extension 
and provision of credit for inputs. These policies do 
compete for resources, but with proper coordinated 
design and implementation can also complement and 
support each other. Thus, Imperial College et al., 2007 
argue, an effective input subsidy implemented efficiently 
and consistently over a number of years with low displace-
ment of commercial sales could simultaneously contribute 
to increased agricultural productivity, increased real 
incomes for poor consumers (through reduced maize 
prices and through increased real wages arising both 
from this and from the stimulus to the rural non-farm 
economy that should follow). It would not, however, 
promote stable low maize prices unless (a) consistently 
implemented over a sustained period and (b) accompa-
nied by consistent reliable policies that will augment 
domestic grain supplies in the event of a climatic shock 
(strategic grain reserves and/or imports and import 
finance). Similarly it should be more effective if accom-
panied by:
 Social protection policies that protect people against  •
other shocks and assist the productive poor to access 
matching funds
Agricultural interventions promoting research and  •
extension for maize and for other crops, and improved 
access to seasonal finance for other crops
Road construction and policies promoting both growth  •
of the non-farm economy and of the private sector (in 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors).
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Policies promoting wider private sector development  •
across the country
Health and education investments to promote a flex- •
ible and productive population able to respond to and 
create new economic opportunities.
The relationship of the input subsidy programme with 
complementary policies is illustrated in Figure 2.
Viewing the subsidy programme in this way poses 
challenges and some hard questions about policy coor-
dination and phasing, particularly regarding (a) maize 
markets and prices (as influenced by producer subsidies 
and trade policy) and (b) the processes of structural 
change which are essential for development and which 
the programme should be trying to promote. 
What are appropriate prices for maize that will (a) allow  •
local real incomes and demand for local goods and 
services to increase so that poor deficit producers can 
concentrate on other more productive activities 
serving this demand but (b) give other farmers the 
incentive to produce a surplus? How will this differ 
between different areas and change over time?  How 
should this relate to maize trade policy, and particularly 
export policy?
How can the processes of development and structural  •
transitions be managed consistently, allowing 
consumers and producers to have confidence in maize 
markets and promoting non-farm and private sector 
development to occur at different speeds in, for 
example, more and less remote areas?
Dorward, 2007 explores some of these issues using 
simulations of interactions between different household 
types within low and high population density rural 
economies, with explicit attention to interactions through 
maize and labour markets. This analysis draws out the 
importance of understanding different direct effects of 
subsidy access on different households and the different 
indirect effects of these as they affect labour and maize 
markets. These are illustrated in figure 3, which shows a 
rather complex set of direct and indirect impacts and 
their relationships.
There are three possible uses of the subsidy by subsidy 
recipients: reselling of coupons or subsidized inputs (this 
is likely to be more common among poorer households 
but was not commonly reported in 2007), use of the 
inputs in production, or displacement of otherwise 
unsubsidised purchases (common among less poor 
households). These lead to two main types of direct 
benefit for recipients: immediate income transfers from 
reselling or displacement, or incremental production at 
harvest if the inputs are used on farm7. We consider these 
in turn. 
Transfers are likely to lead to immediate tightening of 
the labour market, as poorer households hire out less 
ganyu (which they would otherwise do to meet imme-
diate consumption requirement) and (to a much lesser 
extent) less poor households increase their immediate 
consumption of local goods and services. Increased 
wages lead to immediate real income and hence welfare 
and consumption gains to poorer households, both 
recipients and non-recipients. Increased real incomes for 
the poor (or the need to hire out less labour) should also 
mean that gains from direct transfers to poor people and 
higher wages should lead to subsequent incremental 
production and welfare gains to them, even without any 
incremental input use (though these will be offset to 
some extent in the wider economy by losses of low cost 
labour to the less poor). Less poor people who hire in 
labour may, however, incur a loss in net real income if 
they have to pay higher wages when hiring labour in 
Figure 1. Vicious Circle of the Low Productivity Maize Production Trap
Source: Imperial College et al., 2007
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and for purchasing local goods and services whose prices 
are determined largely by unskilled wage costs. 
Incremental production from incremental use of 
inputs and/or incremental use of labour on maize should 
lead to lower maize prices at harvest and during the 
subsequent season, with greater households stocks of 
maize (depending on receipt and use of the subsidy and 
on the extent and effects of increased pre harvest wages). 
This benefits poorer people who are net maize buyers, 
and should lead to increased real incomes and consump-
tion of maize and other goods and services. Net sellers 
of maize, on the other hand, will suffer reduced real 
incomes. Changes in income in the subsequent season 
then have similar impacts on labour markets and wages 
as those discussed for the first season. Further subsidy 
impacts shown in figure 3 are that increased real incomes 
should lead to greater farm and non-farm investment 
(in human and social capital as well as in financial, natural 
and physical capital for particular enterprises), and that 
growing real incomes in rural areas should lead to 
increased  demand for locally produced goods and serv-
ices, including non staple foods. Impacts on demand for 
and investment in input services will depend heavily on 
the way that subsidies are implemented.
Dorward, 2007 estimates direct impacts from receipt 
of a subsidised package of one 50kg bag of fertilizer and 
2kg maize seed are increases of between  2 and 5% in 
net income in the year of subsidy (with higher propor-
tionate but smaller absolute net income gains for poorer 
households). If, however, impacts of the indirect effects 
of a universal subsidy are taken into account, then poorer 
households real net income gains rise to 6 to 8% in both 
the subsidy year and in the subsequent year, even without 
the implementation of a subsidy in the subsequent 
year.
The points that arise from this rather detailed discus-
sion are that important distinctions need to be made 
between direct transfer and incremental input use 
impacts, and between the impacts of these on poorer 
and less poor households both in the year of implemen-
tation and in the subsequent year. In this different effects 
on poor and less poor recipients need to be considered, 
taking account of complex production, welfare, labour 
and maize market effects within the rural economy. 
Important policy issues about targeting emerge from 
this, regarding both targeting between areas with greater 
or smaller proportions of poor and less poor people, and 
targeting between poor and less poor people within 
areas. Consideration of the relative benefits of input, cash 
or food transfers must also take account of different 
market externalities, targeting/ access issues, and imple-
mentation costs associated with these different social 
protection instruments.
Conclusions: lessons from 
the Malawian experience
This paper has reviewed the context of the Malawian 
experience of interactions between agricultural and 
social protection policies and examined the evolution 
of agricultural and social protection policies and instru-
ments over the last 40 years or so, in terms of their inter-
actions and outcome. 
We highlight the following main lessons:
The market and livelihood context of Malawi has been 
a major determinant of the evolution of agricultural and 
social protection policies and continues to be a major 
Figure 2 Policies to Attack the Low Productivity Maize Production Trap
Source: Imperial College et al., 2007
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determinant of the nature of the interactions and poten-
tial interactions between them. Critical elements of this 
context are poverty, seasonality, vulnerability, low 
productivity, high dependence on maize, high land pres-
sure, poor market development and infrastructure, maize 
price variability, and the importance and fragility of casual 
(ganyu) labour markets in the livelihoods and ‘coping 
strategies’ of poor people. Great care needs to be taken 
in transferring lessons from Malawi to other countries 
with different market and livelihood structures and 
constraints (and conversely care needs to be taken in 
applying in Malawi lessons from elsewhere).
The political context, both domestic politics and their 
interaction with donor interests, has been another major 
determinant of the evolution of agricultural and social 
protection policies.
 There are enormous complexities in the number of 
issues and stakeholders affecting the development 
and impacts of different policies and instruments, 
and in the changing nature of and conflicting and 
complementary relationships between the issues, 
and contested perceptions about them. Debates 
around these issues concern national and household 
food security and food self-sufficiency; dependence 
on and diversification out of maize as a staple crop, 
the potential for other food crops and impacts of 
cash crop development on food security, poverty 
and growth; the role of markets; government and 
private sector roles and relationships; likely changes 
in and effects of maize price and wage rate changes 
under different scenarios; costs, private benefits and 
market externalities from different forms of transfers 
and subsidies; targeting mechanisms, their costs and 
effectiveness, and their (local and regional) social and 
political implications; differing  emphases on different 
technical and social analyses and objectives; and 
conflicts and synergies between short, medium and 
long term objectives. 
Policy outcomes are complex and determined by 
choice of instruments and means of implementation. 
The use of subsidy vouchers and the way that they are 
distributed and redeemed has profound effects on policy 
impacts – in terms of  overall welfare and growth, the 
distribution of those gains among poor and less poor 
people, and the development of commercial input 
delivery services.
It is important that long term growth and develop-
ment objectives are thought through and articulated, 
so that short to medium term decisions take account of 
them and instruments are modified and scaled up and 
out in ways that are consistent with long term growth 
and development aims and processes- and this should 
involve investing in agricultural productivity and food 
security to enable poor rural people to move out of 
agriculture. 
A mix of complementary social protection, agricultural 
and wider economic and institutional policies across 
different sectors are needed for effective promotion of 
short, medium and long term social protection, agricul-
tural and non-agricultural development, and poverty 
reduction.  
We conclude with a brief discussion of two issues that 
have not yet been addressed in the paper but that need 
to be mentioned as significant for any consideration of 
agricultural and social protection policy interactions in 
M a l a w i :  f i n a n c i a l  t r a d e - o f f s  a n d  g e n d e r 
considerations. 
Examination of financial trade-offs is difficult given 
difficulties in making precise classifications of different 
programmes and identifying their costs. Slater and Tsoka, 
2007 present a table with the costs of the main social 
protection interventions from 2002/3 to 2005/6, but 
recognise that data for a number of projects is missing, 
and recognize a number of reporting difficulties, so that 
Figure 3 Tracing out direct and indirect subsidy impacts
Working Paper 007 www.future-agricultures.org16
costs are generally under-estimated. Table 4 compares 
the costs of programmes listed in Slater and Tsoka, 2007 
and grouped according to our classification of social 
protection instruments independent of, for, through and 
with agriculture, but grouping programmes ‘independent 
of’ and ‘for’ agriculture together as (a) it is not possible 
to differentiate them in the table from Slater and Tsoka, 
2007 and (b) our major interest is in comparing 
programmes working ‘through’ and ‘with’ agriculture 
against others. Treating the figures with appropriate 
caution, it is nevertheless interesting to note that social 
protection independent of and for agriculture has 
consumed the lion’s share of resources (much of it in 
emergency relief ). Social protection through and with 
agriculture are, respectively, dominated by the Targeted 
Input programme prior to 2005/6,and by the input 
subsidy programme in 2005/6. However the trade-offs 
in spending between different types of programme are 
difficult to identify as these will vary by funding source 
(different donors and the Government budget). The 
2005/6 and 2006/7 subsidies were (respectively) entirely 
and largely funded by the Government budget, and the 
2006/7 programme was budgeted to take up 43% of the 
Ministry of Agriculture budget in direct (not overhead 
costs) and the programme was subsequently 26% over 
budget.
Gender issues are critical to food security in Malawi, 
to agricultural and non-agricultural opportunities and 
constraints and to access to targeted food, cash or input 
transfers for households with different characteristics (for 
example male and female headed households). In general 
terms female headed households in Malawi tend to have 
less land and to be poorer and more food insecure than 
male headed households, though there are less poor 
female headed households, and the greater number of 
male headed households means that there are more poor 
male headed households than poor female headed 
households. Relative situations and numbers of male and 
female headed households also vary between different 
areas. However poor female headed households tend 
to have higher dependency ratios and hence be more 
labour constrained than poor male headed households 
(National Statistical Office, 2005; Dorward, 2007), and 
this suggests that they may be less likely to be able to 
make incremental use of subsidized inputs, and hence 
other forms of transfer may be more appropriate for them 
than input subsidies. This is a general concern regarding 
high dependenc y rat io,  labour constrained 
households. 
Programme types Years Cost (US$ M)
Total Annual
Social protection independent of / for agriculture 2003-6 402 100
Social protection through agriculture* 2003-5 76 25
Social protection with agriculture 2005/6 60 60
Total social protection 538
* excludes 2002/3 extended TIP, likely to add approximately 40mUS$ to total and to increase annual cost of social 
protection through agriculture to a little under 40mUS$. Annual figures are divided by number of years 
implemented
Source: calculated from Slater and Tsoka, 2007
Table 6. Comparison of social protection programme costs, 2002/3 to 2006
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End Notes
1  from Imperial College et al., 2007 
2  From the mid 1990s there have been major 
improvements in primary school enrolment and its 
gender balance (but not in the quality of primary 
education) and substantial falls in infant and under five 
mortality (though these are still very high). 
3  From 2005 there has been a dramatic improvement in 
macro economic management and consequent 
reduction of inflation and interest rates and much 
greater currency stability. Good weather and input 
subsidies have also contributed to growth in food 
production, as will be discussed later. In the previous 
decade there had been few bright spots. 
4  Thus from 1964 to 1977 the estate sector grew at an 
average of 17% per annum while smallholder 
agriculture grew at less than 3% per annum Harrigan, 
2003. 
5  Latest estimates are 30 to 40% displacement in 
2006/7 (SOAS et al, 2008).
6  Maize prices rose dramatically in January to March 
2008, reflecting maize shortages following the export 
of 300,000 mt to Zimbabwe, and possible stock losses 
from other causes. 
7  Note that the purchases of resold inputs may lead to 
displacement and transfer benefits or incremental use 
and incremental production benefits.
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